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import os
import sha
import tempfile
from django.test import TestCase, client
from django.utils import simplejson
class FileUploadTests(TestCase):
def test_simple_upload(self):
post_data = {
'name': 'Ringo',
'file_field': open(__file__),
}
response = self.client.post('/file_uploads/upload/', post_data)
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
def test_large_upload(self):
tdir = tempfile.gettempdir()
file1 = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(suffix=".file1", dir=tdir)
file1.write('a' * (2 ** 21))
file1.seek(0)
file2 = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(suffix=".file2", dir=tdir)
file2.write('a' * (10 * 2 ** 20))
file2.seek(0)
# This file contains chinese symbols for a name.
file3 = open(os.path.join(tdir, u'test_中文_Orl\u00e9ans.jpg'.encode('utf-8')), 'w+b')
file3.write('b' * (2 ** 10))
file3.seek(0)
post_data = {
'name': 'Ringo',
'file_field1': open(file1.name),
'file_field2': open(file2.name),
'file_unicode': file3,
}
for key in post_data.keys():
try:
post_data[key + '_hash'] = sha.new(post_data[key].read()).hexdigest()
post_data[key].seek(0)
except AttributeError:
post_data[key + '_hash'] = sha.new(post_data[key]).hexdigest()
response = self.client.post('/file_uploads/verify/', post_data)
try:
os.unlink(file3.name)
except:
pass
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
def test_dangerous_file_names(self):
"""Uploaded file names should be sanitized before ever reaching the view."""
# This test simulates possible directory traversal attacks by a
# malicious uploader We have to do some monkeybusiness here to construct
# a malicious payload with an invalid file name (containing os.sep or
# os.pardir). This similar to what an attacker would need to do when
# trying such an attack.
scary_file_names = [
"/tmp/hax0rd.txt", # Absolute path, *nix-style.
"C:\\Windows\\hax0rd.txt", # Absolute path, win-syle.
"C:/Windows/hax0rd.txt", # Absolute path, broken-style.
"\\tmp\\hax0rd.txt", # Absolute path, broken in a different way.
"/tmp\\hax0rd.txt", # Absolute path, broken by mixing.
"subdir/hax0rd.txt", # Descendant path, *nix-style.
"subdir\\hax0rd.txt", # Descendant path, win-style.
"sub/dir\\hax0rd.txt", # Descendant path, mixed.
"../../hax0rd.txt", # Relative path, *nix-style.
"..\\..\\hax0rd.txt", # Relative path, win-style.
"../..\\hax0rd.txt" # Relative path, mixed.
]
payload = []
for i, name in enumerate(scary_file_names):
payload.extend([
'--' + client.BOUNDARY,
'Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file%s"; filename="%s"' % (i, name),
'Content-Type: application/octet-stream',
'',
'You got pwnd.'
])
payload.extend([
'--' + client.BOUNDARY + '--',
'',
])
payload = "\r\n".join(payload)
r = {
'CONTENT_LENGTH': len(payload),
'CONTENT_TYPE': client.MULTIPART_CONTENT,
'PATH_INFO': "/file_uploads/echo/",
'REQUEST_METHOD': 'POST',
'wsgi.input': client.FakePayload(payload),
}
response = self.client.request(**r)
# The filenames should have been sanitized by the time it got to the view.
recieved = simplejson.loads(response.content)
for i, name in enumerate(scary_file_names):
got = recieved["file%s" % i]
self.assertEqual(got, "hax0rd.txt")
def test_filename_overflow(self):
"""File names over 256 characters (dangerous on some platforms) get fixed up."""
name = "%s.txt" % ("f"*500)
payload = "\r\n".join([
'--' + client.BOUNDARY,
'Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="%s"' % name,
'Content-Type: application/octet-stream',
'',
'Oops.'
'--' + client.BOUNDARY + '--',
'',
])
r = {
'CONTENT_LENGTH': len(payload),
'CONTENT_TYPE': client.MULTIPART_CONTENT,
'PATH_INFO': "/file_uploads/echo/",
'REQUEST_METHOD': 'POST',
'wsgi.input': client.FakePayload(payload),
}
got = simplejson.loads(self.client.request(**r).content)
self.assert_(len(got['file']) < 256, "Got a long file name (%s characters)." % len(got['file']))
def test_custom_upload_handler(self):
# A small file (under the 5M quota)
smallfile = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile()
smallfile.write('a' * (2 ** 21))
# A big file (over the quota)
bigfile = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile()
bigfile.write('a' * (10 * 2 ** 20))
# Small file posting should work.
response = self.client.post('/file_uploads/quota/', {'f': open(smallfile.name)})
got = simplejson.loads(response.content)
self.assert_('f' in got)
# Large files don't go through.
response = self.client.post("/file_uploads/quota/", {'f': open(bigfile.name)})
got = simplejson.loads(response.content)
self.assert_('f' not in got)
def test_broken_custom_upload_handler(self):
f = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile()
f.write('a' * (2 ** 21))
# AttributeError: You cannot alter upload handlers after the upload has been processed.
self.assertRaises(
AttributeError,
self.client.post,
'/file_uploads/quota/broken/',
{'f': open(f.name)}
)
def test_fileupload_getlist(self):
file1 = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile()
file1.write('a' * (2 ** 23))
file2 = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile()
file2.write('a' * (2 * 2 ** 18))
file2a = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile()
file2a.write('a' * (5 * 2 ** 20))
response = self.client.post('/file_uploads/getlist_count/', {
'file1': open(file1.name),
'field1': u'test',
'field2': u'test3',
'field3': u'test5',
'field4': u'test6',
'field5': u'test7',
'file2': (open(file2.name), open(file2a.name))
})
got = simplejson.loads(response.content)
self.assertEqual(got.get('file1'), 1)
self.assertEqual(got.get('file2'), 2)
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