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-rw-r--r--django/core/files/storage.py9
-rw-r--r--docs/releases/2.2.26.txt9
-rw-r--r--tests/file_storage/test_generate_filename.py19
-rw-r--r--tests/file_storage/tests.py6
4 files changed, 36 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/django/core/files/storage.py b/django/core/files/storage.py
index 89faa626e6..ea5bbc82d0 100644
--- a/django/core/files/storage.py
+++ b/django/core/files/storage.py
@@ -51,7 +51,10 @@ class Storage:
content = File(content, name)
name = self.get_available_name(name, max_length=max_length)
- return self._save(name, content)
+ name = self._save(name, content)
+ # Ensure that the name returned from the storage system is still valid.
+ validate_file_name(name, allow_relative_path=True)
+ return name
# These methods are part of the public API, with default implementations.
@@ -67,6 +70,7 @@ class Storage:
Return a filename that's free on the target storage system and
available for new content to be written to.
"""
+ name = str(name).replace('\\', '/')
dir_name, file_name = os.path.split(name)
if '..' in pathlib.PurePath(dir_name).parts:
raise SuspiciousFileOperation("Detected path traversal attempt in '%s'" % dir_name)
@@ -101,6 +105,7 @@ class Storage:
Validate the filename by calling get_valid_name() and return a filename
to be passed to the save() method.
"""
+ filename = str(filename).replace('\\', '/')
# `filename` may include a path as returned by FileField.upload_to.
dirname, filename = os.path.split(filename)
if '..' in pathlib.PurePath(dirname).parts:
@@ -296,6 +301,8 @@ class FileSystemStorage(Storage):
if self.file_permissions_mode is not None:
os.chmod(full_path, self.file_permissions_mode)
+ # Ensure the saved path is always relative to the storage root.
+ name = os.path.relpath(full_path, self.location)
# Store filenames with forward slashes, even on Windows.
return name.replace('\\', '/')
diff --git a/docs/releases/2.2.26.txt b/docs/releases/2.2.26.txt
index 2ed9b32119..7fbdc02089 100644
--- a/docs/releases/2.2.26.txt
+++ b/docs/releases/2.2.26.txt
@@ -36,3 +36,12 @@ As a reminder, all untrusted user input should be validated before use.
This issue has severity "low" according to the :ref:`Django security policy
<security-disclosure>`.
+
+CVE-2021-45452: Potential directory-traversal via ``Storage.save()``
+====================================================================
+
+``Storage.save()`` allowed directory-traversal if directly passed suitably
+crafted file names.
+
+This issue has severity "low" according to the :ref:`Django security policy
+<security-disclosure>`.
diff --git a/tests/file_storage/test_generate_filename.py b/tests/file_storage/test_generate_filename.py
index cb64650920..fd8da6debf 100644
--- a/tests/file_storage/test_generate_filename.py
+++ b/tests/file_storage/test_generate_filename.py
@@ -53,13 +53,20 @@ class GenerateFilenameStorageTests(SimpleTestCase):
s.generate_filename(file_name)
def test_storage_dangerous_paths_dir_name(self):
- file_name = '/tmp/../path'
+ candidates = [
+ ('tmp/../path', 'tmp/..'),
+ ('tmp\\..\\path', 'tmp/..'),
+ ('/tmp/../path', '/tmp/..'),
+ ('\\tmp\\..\\path', '/tmp/..'),
+ ]
s = FileSystemStorage()
- msg = "Detected path traversal attempt in '/tmp/..'"
- with self.assertRaisesMessage(SuspiciousFileOperation, msg):
- s.get_available_name(file_name)
- with self.assertRaisesMessage(SuspiciousFileOperation, msg):
- s.generate_filename(file_name)
+ for file_name, path in candidates:
+ msg = "Detected path traversal attempt in '%s'" % path
+ with self.subTest(file_name=file_name):
+ with self.assertRaisesMessage(SuspiciousFileOperation, msg):
+ s.get_available_name(file_name)
+ with self.assertRaisesMessage(SuspiciousFileOperation, msg):
+ s.generate_filename(file_name)
def test_filefield_dangerous_filename(self):
candidates = [
diff --git a/tests/file_storage/tests.py b/tests/file_storage/tests.py
index 0e692644b7..4c6f6920ed 100644
--- a/tests/file_storage/tests.py
+++ b/tests/file_storage/tests.py
@@ -291,6 +291,12 @@ class FileStorageTests(SimpleTestCase):
self.storage.delete('path/to/test.file')
+ def test_file_save_abs_path(self):
+ test_name = 'path/to/test.file'
+ f = ContentFile('file saved with path')
+ f_name = self.storage.save(os.path.join(self.temp_dir, test_name), f)
+ self.assertEqual(f_name, test_name)
+
def test_save_doesnt_close(self):
with TemporaryUploadedFile('test', 'text/plain', 1, 'utf8') as file:
file.write(b'1')