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authorJacob Walls <jacobtylerwalls@gmail.com>2026-03-31 15:43:18 -0400
committerJacob Walls <jacobtylerwalls@gmail.com>2026-04-02 09:19:07 -0400
commit2ee757ee502d5663f932dc5c35175c39af4640ce (patch)
treed540419df5cd17f7ccb22b84213cc64682758970 /docs/howto/auth-remote-user.txt
parenta32c7075cf634aee1f4f3deecd27f194097ec0c2 (diff)
Fixed #36862 -- Doc'd the need for a proxy when deploying RemoteUserMiddleware under ASGI.
We have a flood of nuisance security reports describing ASGI deployments using RemoteUserMiddleware without a fronting proxy, which is not realistic.
Diffstat (limited to 'docs/howto/auth-remote-user.txt')
-rw-r--r--docs/howto/auth-remote-user.txt29
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/docs/howto/auth-remote-user.txt b/docs/howto/auth-remote-user.txt
index 533f460e4a..fe48bb3dc8 100644
--- a/docs/howto/auth-remote-user.txt
+++ b/docs/howto/auth-remote-user.txt
@@ -99,19 +99,26 @@ instead of :class:`django.contrib.auth.middleware.RemoteUserMiddleware`::
.. warning::
- Be very careful if using a ``RemoteUserMiddleware`` subclass with a custom
- HTTP header. You must be sure that your front-end web server always sets or
- strips that header based on the appropriate authentication checks, never
- permitting an end-user to submit a fake (or "spoofed") header value. Since
- the HTTP headers ``X-Auth-User`` and ``X-Auth_User`` (for example) both
- normalize to the ``HTTP_X_AUTH_USER`` key in ``request.META``, you must
- also check that your web server doesn't allow a spoofed header using
+ ``RemoteUserMiddleware`` must not be deployed in configurations where a
+ client can supply the header. You must be sure that your web server or
+ reverse proxy always sets or strips that header based on the appropriate
+ authentication checks, never permitting an end user to submit a fake (or
+ "spoofed") header value. In particular, ASGI deployments cannot be exposed
+ directly to the internet (that is, without a reverse proxy) when using this
+ middleware.
+
+ Since the HTTP headers ``X-Auth-User`` and ``X-Auth_User`` (for example)
+ both normalize to the ``HTTP_X_AUTH_USER`` key in ``request.META``, you
+ must also check that your web server doesn't allow a spoofed header using
underscores in place of dashes.
- This warning doesn't apply to ``RemoteUserMiddleware`` in its default
- configuration with ``header = 'REMOTE_USER'``, since a key that doesn't
- start with ``HTTP_`` in ``request.META`` can only be set by your WSGI
- or ASGI server, not directly from an HTTP request header.
+ Under WSGI, this warning doesn't apply to ``RemoteUserMiddleware`` in its
+ default configuration with ``header = "REMOTE_USER"``, since a key that
+ doesn't start with ``HTTP_`` in ``request.META`` can only be set by your
+ WSGI server, not directly from an HTTP request header. This warning *does*
+ apply by default on ASGI, because in the async path, the middleware
+ prepends ``HTTP_`` to the defined header name before looking it up in
+ ``request.META``.
If you need more control, you can create your own authentication backend
that inherits from :class:`~django.contrib.auth.backends.RemoteUserBackend` and