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authorMariusz Felisiak <felisiak.mariusz@gmail.com>2022-01-21 07:50:03 +0100
committerMariusz Felisiak <felisiak.mariusz@gmail.com>2022-02-01 07:54:17 +0100
commitd16133568ef9c9b42cb7a08bdf9ff3feec2e5468 (patch)
treec2ac52bb398b8f63d617155103ddd19413d2ec18
parent1a1e8278c46418bde24c86a65443b0674bae65e2 (diff)
[3.2.x] Fixed CVE-2022-23833 -- Fixed DoS possiblity in file uploads.
Thanks Alan Ryan for the report and initial patch. Backport of fc18f36c4ab94399366ca2f2007b3692559a6f23 from main.
-rw-r--r--django/http/multipartparser.py2
-rw-r--r--docs/releases/2.2.27.txt6
-rw-r--r--docs/releases/3.2.12.txt6
-rw-r--r--tests/file_uploads/tests.py20
4 files changed, 34 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/django/http/multipartparser.py b/django/http/multipartparser.py
index f464caa1b4..35a54f4ca1 100644
--- a/django/http/multipartparser.py
+++ b/django/http/multipartparser.py
@@ -248,6 +248,8 @@ class MultiPartParser:
remaining = len(stripped_chunk) % 4
while remaining != 0:
over_chunk = field_stream.read(4 - remaining)
+ if not over_chunk:
+ break
stripped_chunk += b"".join(over_chunk.split())
remaining = len(stripped_chunk) % 4
diff --git a/docs/releases/2.2.27.txt b/docs/releases/2.2.27.txt
index b1712c649c..688a482575 100644
--- a/docs/releases/2.2.27.txt
+++ b/docs/releases/2.2.27.txt
@@ -15,3 +15,9 @@ posing an XSS attack vector.
In order to avoid this vulnerability, ``{% debug %}`` no longer outputs an
information when the ``DEBUG`` setting is ``False``, and it ensures all context
variables are correctly escaped when the ``DEBUG`` setting is ``True``.
+
+CVE-2022-23833: Denial-of-service possibility in file uploads
+=============================================================
+
+Passing certain inputs to multipart forms could result in an infinite loop when
+parsing files.
diff --git a/docs/releases/3.2.12.txt b/docs/releases/3.2.12.txt
index 31bc7d2c59..0907050791 100644
--- a/docs/releases/3.2.12.txt
+++ b/docs/releases/3.2.12.txt
@@ -15,3 +15,9 @@ posing an XSS attack vector.
In order to avoid this vulnerability, ``{% debug %}`` no longer outputs an
information when the ``DEBUG`` setting is ``False``, and it ensures all context
variables are correctly escaped when the ``DEBUG`` setting is ``True``.
+
+CVE-2022-23833: Denial-of-service possibility in file uploads
+=============================================================
+
+Passing certain inputs to multipart forms could result in an infinite loop when
+parsing files.
diff --git a/tests/file_uploads/tests.py b/tests/file_uploads/tests.py
index 7bc8d41dac..18e4174fd0 100644
--- a/tests/file_uploads/tests.py
+++ b/tests/file_uploads/tests.py
@@ -143,6 +143,26 @@ class FileUploadTests(TestCase):
def test_big_base64_newlines_upload(self):
self._test_base64_upload("Big data" * 68000, encode=base64.encodebytes)
+ def test_base64_invalid_upload(self):
+ payload = client.FakePayload('\r\n'.join([
+ '--' + client.BOUNDARY,
+ 'Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="test.txt"',
+ 'Content-Type: application/octet-stream',
+ 'Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64',
+ ''
+ ]))
+ payload.write(b'\r\n!\r\n')
+ payload.write('--' + client.BOUNDARY + '--\r\n')
+ r = {
+ 'CONTENT_LENGTH': len(payload),
+ 'CONTENT_TYPE': client.MULTIPART_CONTENT,
+ 'PATH_INFO': '/echo_content/',
+ 'REQUEST_METHOD': 'POST',
+ 'wsgi.input': payload,
+ }
+ response = self.client.request(**r)
+ self.assertEqual(response.json()['file'], '')
+
def test_unicode_file_name(self):
with sys_tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir:
# This file contains Chinese symbols and an accented char in the name.