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This reverts commit b109ff8062f4bb225181ec462d69c9dd79339567 and
complement test cases. The change was too hasty, as some form
values cannot be json-serialized as is.
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Refs #18340
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Using cPickle, two apparently identical Unicode strings could
generate different pickled results depending on previous operations
on those strings.
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django.contrib.formtools.utils.security_hash().
git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@17841 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
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the work on the patch and Alex for reviewing.
git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@16539 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
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git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@15972 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
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git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@15931 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
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#15702 -- thanks to jonash for the patch. Splitting this over muliple commits to make it more manageable.
git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@15926 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
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All adhoc MAC applications have been updated to use HMAC, using SHA1 to
generate unique keys for each application based on the SECRET_KEY, which is
common practice for this situation. In all cases, backwards compatibility
with existing hashes has been maintained, aiming to phase this out as per
the normal deprecation process. In this way, under most normal
circumstances the old hashes will have expired (e.g. by session expiration
etc.) before they become invalid.
In the case of the messages framework and the cookie backend, which was
already using HMAC, there is the possibility of a backwards incompatibility
if the SECRET_KEY is shorter than the default 50 bytes, but the low
likelihood and low impact meant compatibility code was not worth it.
All known instances where tokens/hashes were compared using simple string
equality, which could potentially open timing based attacks, have also been
fixed using a constant-time comparison function.
There are no known practical attacks against the existing implementations,
so these security improvements will not be backported.
git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@14218 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
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workarounds. Thanks to timo and claudep for the patch.
git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@13094 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
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forms or forms without changed data.
git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@10753 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
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browsers that submit leading/trailing whitespace in form fields.
git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@10752 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
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reason. Thanks to Manuel Saelices for the report.
git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@9019 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
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think of this before; thanks to bthomas for providing the obvious fix.
git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@8715 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
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the process, broke the the security hash calculation out to a helper function. Thanks to mcroydon and rajeshdhawan.
git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@8597 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
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