diff options
| author | Alex Gaynor <alex.gaynor@gmail.com> | 2013-11-24 21:05:59 -0600 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Alex Gaynor <alex.gaynor@gmail.com> | 2013-11-24 21:05:59 -0600 |
| commit | 4e07d93325b3989073b181e4505f2e6ed707743b (patch) | |
| tree | 3d903b4026b4f851d169ad09478c7a7fdce0b795 /docs/topics/http | |
| parent | eb38257e5199ca06b8b32f82dd50f64fd6b0d98d (diff) | |
Fixed some unnescesarily gendered language in the docs
Diffstat (limited to 'docs/topics/http')
| -rw-r--r-- | docs/topics/http/sessions.txt | 6 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/docs/topics/http/sessions.txt b/docs/topics/http/sessions.txt index abc99800dd..d39b8344c6 100644 --- a/docs/topics/http/sessions.txt +++ b/docs/topics/http/sessions.txt @@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ Before version 1.6, Django defaulted to using :mod:`pickle` to serialize session data before storing it in the backend. If you're using the :ref:`signed cookie session backend<cookie-session-backend>` and :setting:`SECRET_KEY` is known by an attacker (there isn't an inherent vulnerability in Django that -would cause it to leak), the attacker could insert a string into his session +would cause it to leak), the attacker could insert a string into their session which, when unpickled, executes arbitrary code on the server. The technique for doing so is simple and easily available on the internet. Although the cookie session storage signs the cookie-stored data to prevent tampering, a @@ -659,8 +659,8 @@ domain. This makes session fixation possible if all subdomains are not controlled by trusted users (or, are at least unable to set cookies). For example, an attacker could log into ``good.example.com`` and get a valid -session for his account. If the attacker has control over ``bad.example.com``, -he can use it to send his session key to you since a subdomain is permitted +session for their account. If the attacker has control over ``bad.example.com``, +they can use it to send their session key to you since a subdomain is permitted to set cookies on ``*.example.com``. When you visit ``good.example.com``, you'll be logged in as the attacker and might inadvertently enter your sensitive personal data (e.g. credit card info) into the attackers account. |
