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authorMariusz Felisiak <felisiak.mariusz@gmail.com>2023-10-17 11:48:32 +0200
committerMariusz Felisiak <felisiak.mariusz@gmail.com>2023-11-01 06:30:59 +0100
commitf9a7fb8466a7ba4857eaf930099b5258f3eafb2b (patch)
treecfe6adc993d91c910dcc6e54f46c57c1e33e797b
parente6d2591d9e8a517b891e49de476640ecae93cc41 (diff)
[3.2.x] Fixed CVE-2023-46695 -- Fixed potential DoS in UsernameField on Windows.
Thanks MProgrammer (https://hackerone.com/mprogrammer) for the report.
-rw-r--r--django/contrib/auth/forms.py10
-rw-r--r--docs/releases/3.2.23.txt12
-rw-r--r--tests/auth_tests/test_forms.py8
3 files changed, 27 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/django/contrib/auth/forms.py b/django/contrib/auth/forms.py
index 20d8922799..fb7cfda209 100644
--- a/django/contrib/auth/forms.py
+++ b/django/contrib/auth/forms.py
@@ -62,7 +62,15 @@ class ReadOnlyPasswordHashField(forms.Field):
class UsernameField(forms.CharField):
def to_python(self, value):
- return unicodedata.normalize('NFKC', super().to_python(value))
+ value = super().to_python(value)
+ if self.max_length is not None and len(value) > self.max_length:
+ # Normalization can increase the string length (e.g.
+ # "ff" -> "ff", "½" -> "1⁄2") but cannot reduce it, so there is no
+ # point in normalizing invalid data. Moreover, Unicode
+ # normalization is very slow on Windows and can be a DoS attack
+ # vector.
+ return value
+ return unicodedata.normalize("NFKC", value)
def widget_attrs(self, widget):
return {
diff --git a/docs/releases/3.2.23.txt b/docs/releases/3.2.23.txt
index 0d71a0aa71..ba23d11a71 100644
--- a/docs/releases/3.2.23.txt
+++ b/docs/releases/3.2.23.txt
@@ -6,4 +6,14 @@ Django 3.2.23 release notes
Django 3.2.23 fixes a security issue with severity "moderate" in 3.2.22.
-...
+CVE-2023-46695: Potential denial of service vulnerability in ``UsernameField`` on Windows
+=========================================================================================
+
+The :func:`NFKC normalization <python:unicodedata.normalize>` is slow on
+Windows. As a consequence, ``django.contrib.auth.forms.UsernameField`` was
+subject to a potential denial of service attack via certain inputs with a very
+large number of Unicode characters.
+
+In order to avoid the vulnerability, invalid values longer than
+``UsernameField.max_length`` are no longer normalized, since they cannot pass
+validation anyway.
diff --git a/tests/auth_tests/test_forms.py b/tests/auth_tests/test_forms.py
index 7a731bedc8..c0e1975c1a 100644
--- a/tests/auth_tests/test_forms.py
+++ b/tests/auth_tests/test_forms.py
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ from unittest import mock
from django.contrib.auth.forms import (
AdminPasswordChangeForm, AuthenticationForm, PasswordChangeForm,
PasswordResetForm, ReadOnlyPasswordHashField, ReadOnlyPasswordHashWidget,
- SetPasswordForm, UserChangeForm, UserCreationForm,
+ SetPasswordForm, UserChangeForm, UserCreationForm, UsernameField,
)
from django.contrib.auth.models import User
from django.contrib.auth.signals import user_login_failed
@@ -132,6 +132,12 @@ class UserCreationFormTest(TestDataMixin, TestCase):
self.assertNotEqual(user.username, ohm_username)
self.assertEqual(user.username, 'testΩ') # U+03A9 GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA
+ def test_invalid_username_no_normalize(self):
+ field = UsernameField(max_length=254)
+ # Usernames are not normalized if they are too long.
+ self.assertEqual(field.to_python("½" * 255), "½" * 255)
+ self.assertEqual(field.to_python("ff" * 254), "ff" * 254)
+
def test_duplicate_normalized_unicode(self):
"""
To prevent almost identical usernames, visually identical but differing