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MultiPartParser.
The mitigation for CVE-2026-33033 aligned base64 data to a multiple of
4 by reading whole chunks. As the chunk size is itself a multiple of 4,
those reads never restored the alignment, so a misaligned upload was
read and decoded in full before reaching upload handlers.
Trailing undecoded bytes are now carried over to the next chunk, so no
extra reads are needed and memory use stays bounded by the chunk size.
Thanks to Ignacy Kujawa for the report, and Jake Howard for the review.
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MemoryFileUploadHandler on ASGI.
In ASGI deployments, Content-Length is not guaranteed to reflect the
actual request body size, so relying on it to gate memory allocation
allowed the limit to be bypassed. The handler now enforces
DATA_UPLOAD_MAX_MEMORY_SIZE regardless of the declared header value.
Thanks to Kyle Agronick for the report. Refs #35289.
Co-authored-by: Natalia <124304+nessita@users.noreply.github.com>
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When a multipart file part used `Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64` and
the non-whitespace base64 bytes did not align to a multiple of 4 within
a chunk, the parser entered a loop calling `field_stream.read(1-3)` once
per whitespace byte. Each such call fetched the entire internal buffer,
sliced off 1-3 bytes, and pushed the remainder back via unget(), doing
an O(n) memory copy per call. A 2.5 MB payload of mostly whitespace
produced CPU amplification relative to a normal upload of the same size.
The alignment loop now reads `self._chunk_size` bytes at a time, and
accumulates stripped parts in a list joined once at the end.
Thanks to Seokchan Yoon for the report and the fixing patch.
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encoding.
Added LookupError to the except clause so invalid headers are silently
skipped, consistent with other malformed header handling.
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parse_header_parameters for multipart requests.
Header parsing should apply only to the header value. The previous
implementation happened to work but relied on unintended behavior.
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Rewrapped long docstrings and block comments to 79 characters + newline
using script from https://github.com/medmunds/autofix-w505.
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When matching which entry in the `Accept` header should be used for
a given media type, the specificity matters. However once those are
resolved, only the quality matters when selecting preference.
Regression in c075508b4de8edf9db553b409f8a8ed2f26ecead.
Thank you to Anders Kaseorg for the report.
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The "q" key was removed while addressing ticket #36411. Despite
`MediaType.params` is undocumented and considered internal, it was used
in third-party projects (Zulip reported breakage), so this work restored
the `q` key in `params`.
Thanks Anders Kaseorg for the report.
Regression in c075508b4de8edf9db553b409f8a8ed2f26ecead.
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parameters.
HttpRequest.get_preferred_type() did not account for parameters in
Accept header media types (e.g., "text/vcard; version=3.0"). This caused
incorrect content negotiation when multiple types differed only by
parameters, reducing specificity as per RFC 7231 section 5.3.2
(https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7231.html#section-5.3.2).
This fix updates get_preferred_type() to treat media types with
parameters as distinct, allowing more precise and standards-compliant
matching.
Thanks to magicfelix for the report, and to David Sanders and Sarah
Boyce for the reviews.
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HttpRequest.get_full_path_info() examples.
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https://github.com/psf/black/releases/tag/24.1.0
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headers.
This also allow customizing the maximum size of headers via
MAX_TOTAL_HEADER_SIZE.
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application/x-www-form-urlencoded content type.
Thanks Eki Xu for the report.
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HttpRequest and subclasses."
This reverts commit 6220c445c40a6a7f4d442de8bde2628346153963.
Thanks Adam Johnson and Márton Salomváry for reports.
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Thanks to Jakob Ackermann for the report.
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This avoids a collision when third-party database backends depend on the
Requests HTTP library.
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